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�" test. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 36 (1866) (Every species of tort, 
high seas or navigable waters is of admiralty cognizance). The Court 
in Executive Jet, however, noted "serious difficulties" when the 
"locality" test was mechanically applied to "perverse and casuistic 
borderline situations." /d. at 268. 
This second requirement became most important in noncommercial 
"borderline" situations, and in such cases the federal courts struggled 
to defme "tra�itional maritime activities." Following Chapman v. City 
of Grosse Potnt Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), a case upon 
which the decision in Executive Jet was largely based, the lower 
courts required a relationship between the wrong and maritime com­
merce or navigation. Unfortunately, the strict application of this defi­
nition narrowed the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to a point unin­
tended by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the application of this 
defmition produced irreconcilably different results than if the case had 
involved a commercial vessel. For example, in the case at bar, there 
can be little doubt that, notwithstanding the Admiralty Extension Act, 
46 U.S.C. §740 (1970), a fire on board a commercial vessel which 
destroys the vessel and damages the adjacent pier would fall within 
admiralty jurisdiction. However, the same fire on board a pleasure 
vessel did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because it did not bear 
� significant relation to the traditional maritime activities of naviga­
tiOn or commerce. 
Thus the Supreme Court was faced with the necessity of clarifying 
the test so that it would maintain the desired breadth of jurisdiction 
and also, uniformly between commercial and noncommercial inci­
dents. As a result, the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction is now 
proper, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), when the incident at issue: 1) 
occurs on navigable waters and 2) is a potential hazard to maritime 
commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relation to 
traditional maritime activity. 
In reformulating the test, the Court relied heavily on the underlying 
rationale of its previous decision in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 
457 U.S. §668 (1982) (involving the collision of two pleasure craft). 
In Foremost, the Court recognized that the foundation for admiralty 
jurisdiction in noncommercial situations, was the "potential disruptive 
impact" of such incidents on maritime commerce. Id. at 674-675. In 
the case at bar, the Court decided that this element, when qualified by 
the requirement that the incident also "arise" out of an activity that 
bears a substantial relation to traditional maritime activities, naturally 
served to clarify the intended jurisdiction. 
The Court purposefully relaxed the qualifying requirement and 
emphasized that the definition of "traditional maritime activities" 
requires "broad perspective," in order to maintain the desired breadth 
and uniformity. Thus, under the new test, the Court found, the fire on 
board Sisson's yacht clearly falls within admiralty jurisdiction, as it 
was a potential hazard to maritime commerce that could spread to 
nearby commercial vessels or make the marina inaccessible to such 
vessels, and because it "arose" from an activity that bore a substantial 
relation to traditional maritime activity - the storage and mainte­
nance of a vessel. Moreover, applying the same test to an identical 
commercial situation would produce the same result. 
To ensure that jurisdiction, under this new test, would not be nar­
rowed by application, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the 
incident over which admiralty jurisdiction is sought, must be charac­
terized by its "general features." In this case for example, the jurisdic­
tional inquiry did not turn on the source of the fire or the specific loca­
tion of the yacht, but rather, on whether a fire could potentially disrupt 
maritime commerce. Moreover, the activity from which the incident 
arose was not a laundry room fire on board a vessel, but simply the 
storage and maintenance of a vessel on navigable waters. It is through 
this type of "general" characterization, the court held, that the funda­
mental interest of admiralty jurisdiction will be satisfied. 
The Supreme Court did recognize that Sisson had also argued that 
the Limitation of Liability Act provided an independent basis for mar­
itime jurisdiction. In dictum in the opinion, the Court pointed out that 
since thee was jurisdiction under § 1331(1), there was no need to 
decide that issue. However, the Court implied that if the issue again 
presented itself, it would hold that the Limitation of Liability Act 
would not independently provide jurisdiction. 
Arthur Gribbon '92 
UNITED STATES ex rei. VALDERS STONE & MARBLE V. C· WAY CONSTR. CO. 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 3 August 1990 
909 F.2d 259 
Cargo owner is not liable for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance nor under third party beneficiary theory to barge 
owner for negligence of stevedore with whom cargo owner had contracted. 
FACTS: A contractor on a federal marine construction project in 
Indiana, C-Way Construction Company (C-Way), hired a barge from 
bareboat charterer Selvick Marine Towing Company (Selvick), to 
transport stone. The stone supplier, Valders Stone & Marble 
(Valders), contracted with Rusty Strauss & Son Excavating (Strauss), 
to load the stone on the barge. The barge was damaged in the loading 
process, allegedly as a result of negligence on the part of Strauss. 
When C-Way refused to pay, claiming a setoff due to its obligation to 
compensate Selvick for damage to the barge, Valders brought suit 
against C-Way for payment on the stone. In a trial between Valders 
and C-Way, before a federal magistrate, Valders' motion for summary 
judgment was denied and the dispute was resolved in favor of C-Way. 
Selvick intervened in the suit claiming that Valders was liable for the 
barge damage on the theories of non-delegable duty in contract and 
the warranty of workmanlike performance in admiralty. Summary 
judgment was granted to Valders on Selvick's claim for the reasons 
that Strauss was an independent contractor and that Selvick lacked 
privity with Valders. Selvick appealed and Valders cross-appealed. 
ISSUES: 1) Should the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction be 
applied to a non-admiralty based interlocutory order (Valders v. C­
Way) if its resolution is not essential to resolving the primary appeal? 
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2) Is the cargo owner, Valders, who contracts with a stevedore, 
Strauss, to load stone onto a barge liable to the barge owner, Selvick, 
for damages resulting from alleged negligence on the part of the 
stevedore? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to 
apply pendent appellate jurisdiction to Valders' cross-appeal against 
C-Way, and dismissed it without prejudice. The court found there was 
no admiralty jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit had previously stat­
ed that pendent appellate jurisdiction will be found only in a limited 
number of cases, such as "[w]hen an ordinarily unappealable inter­
locutory order is inextricably entwined with a appealable [interlocuto­
ry] order" and only if "there are compelling reasons for not deferring 
the appeal of the former order to the end of the lawsuit." Ill. ex rei. 
Hartigan V. Peters, 861 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1988). A close rela­
tionship was not adequate, "it must be practically indispensable." 
As to Selvick's appeal, the court applied general maritime law in 
addressing both the breach of implied warranty of workmanlike con­
duct and third party beneficiary arguments. Selvick argued that the 
doctrine developed in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. 
Corp. , 350 U.S. 124 (1956), should be applied. The Ryan doctrine 
was developed to allow a shipowner to bring an indemnity action 
against a stevedore whose breach of the warranty of workmanlike per­
formance, implicit in the stevedoring contract, resulted in injuries for 
which the shipowner was held liable. Its purpose was to make the 
party responsible for the injuries pay for the result of its negligence. 
But while the court noted that the Ryan doctrine might no longer be 
valid, (in light of the adoption by a number of circuits of the policy of 
apportioning liability according to the comparative fault of each party 
as opposed to following indemnity principles espoused in Ryan), the 
court did point out that it was unnecessary to decide its validity 
because Selvick's claim fell outside the scope of Ryan. The warranty 
runs against the stevedore, not against the cargo owner who had mere­
ly hired the stevedore, and in this case Selvick was suing the cargo 
owner, Valders, and not the stevedore, Strauss. 
The court also rejected Selvick's claim that it was an intended ben­
eficiary of the stone supply contract between Valders and C-Way. 
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sees. 302, 304 
(1981), the court held that Selvick was only an incidental beneficiary 
and, therefore, not entitled to damages from Valders. Finally, as 
Selvick was unable to produce any evidence to substantiate its claim 
as an intended beneficiary to the contract, the court held that Valders 
was accountable only to C-Way for any breach caused by the alleged 
negligence of Strauss. 
Stephen W. Beyer '92 
HINES V. BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 23 July 1990 
907 F.2d 726 
Absent an express contractual provision to supervise stevedoring operations, a time charterer has no general duty to do so, and is not liable 
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act for the injuries or death of a longshoreman arising out of such operations. 
FACTS: On October 3, 1987, Clark Hines (Hines), a longshoreman 
who was employed by Ceres Terminals, Inc. (Ceres), was killed while 
performing stevedoring duties aboard the M.S. Ravenna (the 
Ravenna). British Steel Corporation (BSC) had time chartered the 
Ravenna from its owner, Roscoe Shipping, S.A., and had docked the 
vessel in Chicago on October 1, 1987 to unload a cargo of steel. The 
master and the crew of the Ravenna were employees of Roscoe 
Shipping. 
Just prior to the accident, the steel had been completely unloaded 
from the Ravenna. Hines and other Ceres employees were clearing 
dunnage (pieces of lumber used to protect cargo during transport) out 
of the ship's holds. Captain Tore Sorenson, a Ceres superintendent, 
was in charge of the stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. At 
the time of the accident, BSC's cargo representative, John Folan, was 
not on board the vessel. 
An unused bundle of dunnage was secured with Ceres owned 
slings to one of the ship's cranes. The crane operator then improperly 
swung the loaded crane over the open hatch of the hold in which the 
men were working. Swinging a loaded crane over an open hatch while 
men are working below is a forbidden activity and Ceres crane opera­
tors are instructed not to do so. For no discernible reason, the bundle 
of dunnage fell from the crane and struck a dumpster in the hold. The 
bundle broke apart, and pieces of flying dunnage struck Hines, who 
later died. 
Rachelle Hines, wife of the decedent, brought this action as special 
administrator of his estate under the Longshore and Harbor Workers 
(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §905 (b), against BSC to recover damages for 
her husband's death. She filed the suit in the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Illinois, but BSC removed it to the United States District 
Court for the Northern District Of Illinois. BSC then moved for sum­
mary judgment on the grounds that it had no general duty to supervise 
stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. The plaintiff asserted that 
the various agreements BSC made with Ceres and Roscoe Shipping 
showed a clear intent by BSC to control Ceres unloading operations. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BSC, 
fmding that BSC was amenable to suite under the LHWCA but con­
cluding that the Supreme Court decision in Scindia Steam Navigation 
Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) precluded a finding 
that BSC had a general duty to oversee Ceres operations. The court 
found that the language of the charter party, together with Captain 
Sorenson's testimony that Folan took no part in the actual stevedoring 
operations, indicated that BSC had no special duty to ensure the safe­
ty of the longshoremen. Rachelle Hines appealed the decision. 
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ISSUE: Did BSC, a time charterer, owe a duty to Ceres, an indepen­
dent stevedoring contractor, to supervise the stevedoring operations 
aboard the Ravenna? 
ANALYSIS: In Scindia, the Supreme Court interpreted the vessel's 
duty to inspect or supervise the stevedore's cargo operations under the 
1972 amendments to 33 U.S.C. 905(b) as nonexistent. The court held 
that a shipowner "is not liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by 
dangers unknown to him." Although Scindia involved a shipowner 
and not a time charterer, the principles discussed there apply with 
equal force to the present case. 
In this case, the crane was in good working condition, the danger­
ous act of the crane operator was unforeseeable, and the BSC cargo 
representative was not on board the vessel at the time of the accident. 
Under these conditions, the court found, BSC is not liable pursuant to 
Scindia, absent an express contractual agreement. Appellant argued 
that BSC contractually undertook control of the stevedoring opera­
tions and therefore had a duty of care to the Ceres employees under 
Restatement of Torts (Second) 414. The court noted that the com­
ments to Section 414 suggest that the right to make recommendations, 
to inspect, and to order work stopped or resumed is not enough to 
constitute retention of control, and that there must be a retention such 
that the stevedore cannot do the work in his own manner. The court 
also noted that few courts have applied Section 414 in the context of a 
lawsuit under Section 904(b) of the LHWCA, but the Supreme Court 
in Scindia recognized the Restatement as a useful analytical tool. 
However, the court also remarked that Section 414 does not address 
the contractual relationship between BSC and Roscoe Shipping. 
Accordingly, it is applicable only to the various agreements between 
BSC and Ceres. Since BSC did not retain the requisite degree of con­
trol of stevedoring operations outlined in Section 414, no duty is 
imposed on BSC by this section. 
Appellant further argued that clause 8 of the charter agreement 
between BSC and Roscoe Shipping, together with paragraph "j" of 
BSC's instructions to the ship's Master, gave BSC control over the 
discharging of the cargo. Paragraph "j" gave BSC the right to appoint 
a stevedore, who was to remain under the direct control of the ship's 
Master. Clause 8 of the charter party provided in relevant part that the 
captain would be under the orders of BSC and that BSC was to "load, 
stow, trim and discharge the cargo at its own expense but such 
stowage shall be conducted by and under the control of the Master 
and the Owners shall be responsible for the proper stowage and cor­
rect delivery of the cargo." The court observed that clause 8 is a stan-
